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Abstract—The support of obligations with access control poli-
cies allows the expression of more sophisticated requirements
such as usage control, availability and privacy. In order to enable
the use of these policies, it is crucial to ensure their correct
enforcement and management in the system. For this reason,
this paper introduces a set of mutation operators for obligation
policies. The paper ﬁrst identiﬁes key elements in obligation
policy management, then presents mutation operators which
injects minimal errors which affect these aspects. Test cases are
qualiﬁed w.r.t. their ability in detecting problems, simulated by
mutation, in the interactions between policy management and the
application code. The use of policy mutants as substitutes for real
ﬂaws enables a ﬁrst investigation of testing obligation policies in
a system. We validate our work by providing an implementation
of the mutation process: the experiments conducted on a Java
program provide insights for improving test selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of a policy-based approach to specify system
requirements is getting more and more popular [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6]. This is because policies enable the uniform
expression and the dynamic update of requirements as well
as their formal analysis. Security policies specify controls
over actions that system users take on system resources. A
security policy typically consists of permissions, prohibitions,
obligations and dispensations. Permissions (prohibitions) en-
able the speciﬁcation of access control requirements. Obli-
gations (dispensations) allow the speciﬁcation of actions that
users should take to fulﬁll the responsibilities associated with
their roles. Obligations also enable the speciﬁcation of usage
control requirements [7], i.e. the necessary actions related
with particular accesses. For instance, access to a meeting
could be conditional to acceptance of the terms of an access
agreement or the use of a pay phone could be conditional to
the continuous payment of the usage cost.
When policies are used to control user actions, it is essential
to ensure their correct enforcement in the system. Several
works have studied the veriﬁcation of access control policies
[8], [9], [10]. Mutation analysis was applied in the context
of XACML policies [11] and OrBAC policies [12]. Generic
mutation operators for access control policies have been also
proposed in [9]. In this paper, we aim at studying obligation
policies. In particular, we propose the use of mutation analysis
to qualify tests that are used to check the correct behaviour
of a system when the speciﬁcation of this system includes
obligations.
To qualify tests that check a system with obligations, we
propose a set of mutation operators. These operators are
chosen to assess the ability of a test case to detect potential
problems in the management of obligations. More speciﬁcally,
we consider the following policy management aspects: entity
assignments to abstract policy concepts such as roles, hierar-
chies, context management (a context deﬁnes the application
conditions of a rule), obligation rule enforcement and rule
coverage. For each of these aspects, we deﬁne a number
of mutation operators that inject minimal errors into them.
Thus, the inability of a test case to detect mutants would
reveal its incapacity to detect policy enforcement errors. The
main advantage of our approach is that it considers policy
management aspects that are found in most policy languages.
Therefore, they can be easily adapted to be used with other
policy languages than the one considered in this paper [13].
To validate our work, we present an implementation of an
application, which includes obligations. The architecture of
the application that we use separates the application code and
its core functionalities from the policy management module,
which updates security rules in the policy when a change
is detected in the application. We generate mutant policies
using the mutation operators that we introduce in this paper
and then use test cases to study their ability at detecting the
generated mutants. We present the obtained results and discuss
their relevance to the testing of obligation policies.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
a running example that will be used through the paper to
illustrate both the obligation rules and the mutants. Section
3 then introduces the obligation model considered in this
paper and discusses policy management elements. Section 4
introduces the set of mutation operators that we introduce to
simulate policy management errors. Section 5 discusses the
implementation of our policy manager and its integration with
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the application code. Section 6 presents the results of the use
of our methodology to the application example in Section 2
and discusses some of the lessons learnt. Finally, Section 7
overviews related works and Section 8 concludes the paper.
II. RUNNING EXAMPLE
As a running example, we consider a virtual meeting man-
agement system (VMS) providing web conference services.
The virtual meeting server allows meetings to be organized on
a distributed platform. When connected to the server, a user
can enter or exit a meeting, ask to speak, speak, or plan new
meetings. Each meeting has an owner. The owner is the person
who plans the meeting and sets its main parameters (such as
its name, its agenda, etc.). The owner appoints a moderator
for the meeting. The moderator gives the ﬂoor to participants
who may ask to speak. This application contains 6070 lines
of code in 134 classes.
We list below some of the application’s requirements.
• R1: Only the moderator of the application may give the
ﬂoor to a user to speak.
• R2 The users have to accept the usage terms of the
meeting before joining the meeting.
• R3: If the speaker does not push a button to keep the
ﬂoor, access should be revoked.
• R4: After the speaker ﬁnishes, s/he should send a note
including the points that s/he raised in his/her talk if the
meeting type is standard.
The requirement R1 speciﬁes an access control rule, namely
a permission. The requirements R2, R3, and R4 specify
obligations that represent a pre-, ongoing and post-usage
requirements respectively. More precisely, they specify the
actions which should be taken before, while and after certain
accesses respectively. In this paper, we assume that access
control is enforced by the application and we only focus on
the management and testing of obligation policies.
III. OBLIGATIONS FOR USAGE CONTROL
Obligations allow the expression of different requirements.
We focus on usage control, i.e. obligations that need to be
fulﬁlled before, while and after access. For this reason, we
consider the usage model depicted in ﬁgure 1. In this model,
an access may assume one of the following states {idle,
requested, accessing, pre}. The state of an access changes
when relevant actions to this access are taken as shown in
ﬁgure 1. The actions {request, end} are user-actions taken
to request and end access respectively. Other actions {allow,
deny, cond allow, revoke} are system-actions used to enforce
usage control. In particular, these actions represent access
acceptance, denial, conditional access acceptance (i.e. some
obligations should be fulﬁlled before access is allowed) and
access revocation respectively. In this paper, we assume that
every access is associated with the usage control model
in ﬁgure 1 for simplicity. For instance, an action speak
will in fact correspond to two actions request(speak) and
end(speak). Note that an atomic action a with no duration
can be simulated by the immediate execution of the action
idle accessing requested allow 
request 
deny 
pre 
cond_allow allow 
deny 
end/revoke 
Fig. 1. Usage Control Model
end(a) after request(a). For instance, an action send can be
simulated by the consecutive execution of request(send) and
end(send).
A. Policy Language
To specify and manage obligations, we consider the policy
language and model introduced in [13]. This language is a
sorted ﬁrst-order language having ﬁnite sorts of subjects (S),
objects (O) and actions (A). These sorts represent concrete
entities in the system. The language also includes sorts for
contexts (C), security rule identiﬁers (N ), roles (R), activities
(T ) and views (V). These latter sorts denote rule conditions,
rule identiﬁers and groups of subjects, actions and objects
respectively.
User-role, action-activity and object-view assignments
are speciﬁed in the language using the relations
empower(Subject,Role), consider(Action,Activity) and
use(Object,View) respectively. For instance, empower(s, r)
speciﬁes that the subject s is empowered into the role r.
The concrete entities in the language may have attributes.
These attributes are described using application-dependent
predicates.
The language also supports the deﬁnition of role, activity
and view hierarchies [14]. A role, activity and view hierarchy
is a partial order relation over the sets of roles, activi-
ties and views respectively. Hierarchies are speciﬁed using
sub-role(Role1, Role2), sub-activity(Activity1, Activity2),
sub-view(V iew1, V iew2).
Note that assignments of concrete entities to more abstract
concepts such as roles and hierarchies are key concepts in
many policy languages such as [15], [16], [17].
B. Obligation Speciﬁcation
Our obligation rules have the following form.
Obligation(N,SR,AA,OV,Ctxa,Ctxv)
where N is a unique security rule identiﬁer, SR is a subject or
a role, AA is an action or an activity and OV is an object
or a view, Ctxa and Ctxv are context expressions. Ctxa is
called the obligation’s activation context and Ctxv is called its
violation context. A context represents a set of conditions that
is relevant to the management of obligations: the activation
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context deﬁnes the conditions which while true the fulﬁllment
of obligations is required. On the other hand, the violation
context speciﬁes when the obligation is violated.
a) Context Speciﬁcation: We consider two types of con-
texts, namely state-based and event-based contexts. State-
based contexts deﬁne conditions on the state which have to
be true for a context to be true (hold). They are expressions
of the following form1.
Hold(S,A,O,Ctx) ← f1, ..., fn
The context rule above states that the context Ctx holds for
the subject, action and object S,A,O while the conditions f1,...,
fn are true.
For instance, we may specify a state-based context
in meeting that holds for a subject S when S is a participant
in a meeting M and the status of M is ongoing.
Hold(S,A,O, in meeting) ←
Meeting(M, status, ongoing),Meeting(participants, S)
Event-based contexts enable the deﬁnition of contexts in
terms of the actions which activate and deactivate them. These
contexts are speciﬁed using expressions of the following form.
Holde(S,A,O, start/end(Ctx))
after do(S,A,O) if p1, ..., pn
Every state-based Ctx is associated with two event-based
contexts: An event-based context start(Ctx) which repre-
sents the moment at which Ctx begins to hold, and an-
other event-based context end(Ctx) to denote the moment at
which Ctx ceases to hold. For instance, consider the state-
based context in meeting just deﬁned. An event-based context
start(in meeting) holds at the moment when in meeting be-
comes true. The event-based context end(in meeting), on the
other hand, holds when in meeting becomes false (when the
subject S exits the meeting or when the meeting is ended).
b) Context Language: Our context language allows the
composition of contexts using the logical operators conjunc-
tion ∧, disjunction ∨, and negation ¬. The language also
supports the deﬁnition of contexts in the form of an interval
[C1, C2]. An interval context holds from the moment the
context C1 is true until C2 is true. The context language is
deﬁned by the following Backus-Naur Form (BNF) grammar.
CES ::=  | ⊥ | CS | CES & CES | CES ⊕ CES | ¬CES | [ CE , CE ]
CEE ::= CE | start(CES) | end(CES) | CES & CEE | CEE & CES
CE ::= CES | CEE
where CS and CE are user-deﬁned state context identiﬁers
and event-based context identiﬁers respectively. The special
context  which reads true (⊥ which reads false respectively)
represents a context that always (never) holds.
C. Usage Control Contexts:
Usage control contexts are special ﬂuents (facts whose
value may change) that we use at the policy manager level
1The condition part of a rule may be omitted if they are true.
to track the usage state of a resource. For instance, when a
ﬂuent accessing(S,A,O) holds, this means that the subject
S is executing the action A on the object O. We update
these ﬂuents at the occurrence of the actions presented in
the model shown in ﬁgure 1. We specify the update of
ﬂuents using propositions called effect laws. For instance,
we specify that the ﬂuent requested holds for a subject S,
action A and resource O after a user S requests an access
(denoted by the occurrence of an action request(S,A,O))
until the request is granted, denied or conditionally
allowed (denoted by the occurrence of one the actions
grant(S,A,O), deny(S,A,O), cond grant(S,A,O). The
rules below show how we specify when the policy manager
updates usage control contexts of type requested.
request(S,A,O)
causes requested(S,A,O)
cond allow(S,A,O)
causes ¬requested(S,A,O)
deny(S,A,O)
causes ¬requested(S,A,O)
Other usage-control contexts, namely pre and accessing,
are speciﬁed similarly using the actions in the usage control
model depicted in ﬁgure 1.
D. Examples
In this section, we specify the obligations discussed in
section II. These examples are speciﬁed as follows.
Obligation(r2, users, accept terms,meeting,
join requested, delay(2.minutes))
Obligation(r3, users, push button,meeting,
speaking, delay(1.minutes))
Obligation(r4, users, send report,meeting,
end(speaking) ∧ standard meeting, delay(2.minutes))
Hold(S,A,O, join requested) ← requested(S, join,meeting)
Hold(S,A,O, speaking) ← accessing(S, speak,meeting)
Hold(S,A,O, standard meeting) ←
participant(S,O), type(O, standard)
where the context delay(X.timeUnit) is a special context that
is detected X.timeUnit after the activation of the obligation.
Note that an obligation typically has a deadline (a violation
context) which speciﬁes the condition before which the obli-
gation should be fulﬁlled.
The examples above show how usage control contexts
simplify the speciﬁcation of usage control obligations. For
instance, the context speaking holds for a subject S while the
usage control context accessing(S, speak,meeting) is true.
Thus, the use of this context in r3 activates this obligation
while S is speaking. In r4, the obligation is activated after the
person ﬁnishes speaking since the context end(speaking) is
the activation context of r4. The context standard meeting
holds for a subject S and an object (meeting) O if S is one
of the participants of O.
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Inactive Active Fulfilled 
Violated Fulfilled Violated 
End(Ca) 
End(Ca) 
End(Ca) 
Start Oblig Create duty 
Instantiation  
Abstract 
Concrete 
Start(Ca) Fulfilled 
Start(Cv) 
Fulfilled 
End(Ca) 
Fig. 2. State Transitions of Individual Obligations
E. Policy Management
Figure 2 describes obligation management in terms of
change in the state of obligation contexts. Concrete obligations
may assume the states inactive (the obligation is not required
and may be activated), active (the fulﬁlment of the obligation
is required), fulﬁlled (the obligation is satisﬁed), violated (the
obligation is violated but is still required) and fulﬁlled/violated
(the obligation is fulﬁlled but was violated). The end of an
obligation is denoted by its return to the inactive state.
An obligation is managed as follows: an obligation is acti-
vated when its activation context becomes true. An obligation
is fulﬁlled if its action is taken, it is violated if its violation
context becomes true. An obligation is no longer required
when it is deactivated, i.e. when its activation context ceases
to hold.
Note that we unify the representation of obligation rules in
the policy. In particular, we transform all activation contexts of
obligations in the policy into interval contexts as follows: when
the context is a state-based context CS , it is represented as a
context [start(CS), end(CS)]. When the context is an event-
based context CE , it is represented as the context [Ctx,⊥].
Since the special context ⊥ is a context that never holds, an
obligation which activation context is an event-based context
remains required after its activation until it is fulﬁlled. This
means that all obligation rules in the policy have the following
form.
Obligation(N,SR,AA,OV, [Ca, Cd], Cv)
This representation simpliﬁes obligation management and in-
terpretation.
IV. TEST QUALIFICATION AND MUTATION OPERATORS
When an application includes an obligation policy, it is
necessary to ensure that this policy is correctly managed.
In the following, we identify several key aspects that are
relevant to policy management and deﬁne mutation operators
that simulate errors in these aspects. The non-detection of a
mutant by a test case would therefore reveal its incapacity to
detect problems in policy management. Note that we consider
aspects that are commonly found in most policy languages.
This enables the reuse of our mutation operators for other
policy languages after the making of simple modiﬁcations.
Table III presents the mutation operators described below. We
enumerate our different mutation operators and describe their
related policy aspect as follows.
1) Entity Assignments: Tests should reveal problems in
subject-role, action-activity and object-view assign-
ments. To verify this, we simulate an error that affects
a mapping between one of the application’s concrete
entities and the policy’s abstract concepts. We call this
category of mutation operators ’Mapping Operators’.
There are three operators in this category, namely the
subject-role (SRM), action-activity (AAM), and object-
view (OVM) mapping operators. The SRM operator
modiﬁes the mapping between a subject and a role
by changing the subject who is empowered a role by
another subject who is not empowered this role. The
AAM and OVM similarly modify mappings between
action and activities, and objects and views. We may also
consider the simple addition/removal of a subject, action
or object to a role, activity or view respectively. Note
that this error affects the policy only if the role, activity
or view of the assignment is used in at least one security
rule. This constraint is also relevant for all mutation
operators that inject errors into intermediate concepts,
i.e. concepts that simplify policy speciﬁcation, such as
hierarchies, as opposed to security rules themselves.
2) Hierarchies: Tests should ensure that security rules apply
correctly to their role, activity and view. To check this
requirement, our mutation operators inject errors in the
deﬁnition of hierarchies. In particular, we consider the
reduction (HR) and the enlargement (HE) of the scope of
application of a security rule. For instance, we may use
a sub-role or a super-role of the role of a security rule
instead of the speciﬁed role. This category of mutation
operators is called ’Hierarchy Operators’. Note that the
use of this technique requires assuming that there is not
an obligation in the policy that is subsumed by another
rule in the policy; a rule is subsumed by another rule
when it corresponds to an equivalent set or a subset of
the rules deﬁned by this other rule. In table III, we only
show these mutation operators for roles. Operators for
activities and views are similarly deﬁned.
3) Context Management: It is necessary to ensure that rule
conditions are evaluated correctly. In this paper, we
consider contextual policy rules where contexts affect
the applicability of obligations. To ensure that problems
in context evaluation are detected, we deﬁne a set of
mutation operators that change rule contexts. We call
them ’Context operators’. We deﬁne three operators in
this category, one that reduces the scope of application
of the context (CR), one that extends it (CE) and one that
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negates it (CN). We extend the applicability conditions
of a security rule by using the disjunction operator
whereas we reduce the applicability of a rule by using
the conjunction operator. For instance, we replace the
activation context Ca by the composed context Ca∨C1,
where C1 is not equivalent to Ca nor it is not equivalent
to the context ⊥, to extend the applicability of the
security to when the context C1 is true. In a similar way,
we use the context Ca ∧C1 to reduce the application of
the rule to only when the context C1 holds. In table
III, we only show operators for the activation context.
Operators for the deactivation and violation contexts are
similarly deﬁned.
4) Obligation Management: Obligations are managed ac-
cording to the state model in 2. To reveal problems in
the enforcement of this model, we introduce ’Context
Swap operators’. These operators switch the activation,
deactivation and violation contexts of an obligation.
For instance, the activation context is swapped with
the deactivation or violation contexts of the obligation.
The intuition behind this operation is that it simulates
potential problems in the management of obligations, i.e.
the incorrect update of obligation states.
5) Rule Deletion: Tests should be able to detect that an
obligation rule is missing. This ensures rule coverage,
i.e. that the test case veriﬁes all rules in the policy. This
mutation operator is called ’Rule Deletion operator’.
The mutant policy in this case is the original after the
removal of one of its security rules.
Regarding the equivalent mutants issue, most of our oper-
ators do not generate equivalent mutants because the injected
errors lead to a policy that is always different from the initial
policy. It is true for all operators except the context man-
agement operators. In fact, only these operators can generate
equivalents mutants in certain case where the changed context
is equivalent semantically to the initial context. However, we
always check that the context is always different and that it
is not equivalent to the initial context. More generally, it is
possible to detect equivalent mutants by comparing the initial
policy to the mutated policy. The comparison should focus
on contexts since they may lead to the same behavior (when
evaluated).
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Figure 3 shows an overview of the system implementation
and how the obligation policy interacts with the application.
In our architecture, the obligation policy manager mechanism
is implemented in a non-intrusive way separately from the
application core functions. This follows the separation of
concerns principle and allows the simpliﬁcation of both the
application code and the policy management module. It also
allows the separate veriﬁcation and testing of each separately.
In this paper, we focus on the testing of the application code
and the policy manager combined.
The obligation policy manager is composed of two main
components:
Policy 
Obligation 
Processor 
Event 
Observer/ 
Processor 
Application 
Code Event Notification 
(User, Service, Resource) 
Policy Manager 
Fig. 3. Overview of the System
• The event observer/processor: Observes policy-relevant
events in a non-intrusive way using aspect oriented pro-
gramming (AspectJ). These events correspond to service
calls. The events are then processed and their subject,
action and resource are extracted. The obligation pro-
cessor is then notiﬁed to modify the state of the policy
accordingly.
• The obligation processor: receives notiﬁcations of service
executions and updates the state of rules in the policy ac-
cordingly. More precisely, given the user, the service and
the resource, the obligation processor uses the mapping
between the system concepts and the policy to obtain their
corresponding role, activity and view. Then, it computes
the context of security rules in which these elements
are used and their state is updated if necessary, i.e. they
are activated, deactivated, violated or fulﬁlled. Note that
the obligation processor is associated with a policy and
the policy is managed according to this speciﬁed policy.
This allows the dynamic update of the set of obligations
enforced in the system, i.e. when rules in the policy are
modiﬁcations, the modiﬁcation is automatically taken into
account by the obligation policy manager.
In our implementation, we reuse the Virtual Meeting System
which we have used in previous work. This system is imple-
mented in Java and enforces an access control policy deﬁned
using an RBAC policy language. This has simpliﬁed our im-
plementation since some of the concepts needed, namely roles,
activities and views and their mapping to system concepts were
already implemented in the system.
c) Mutation Process: The mutation process proceeds as
follows. The mutants are ﬁrst created by mutating obligation
rules in the policy as described in the previous section.
The existing obligation policy is then replaced by mutant
policies. Test cases that are created or generated to validate
the implementation are run against the mutated versions of the
policy. A mutant is detected when a test case fails. Note that
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Operator Original Policy (P) Mutated Policy (Pm)
SRM {..., empower(S,R), obligation(N,R,A, V, [Ca, Cd], Cv),
subject(S′),¬empower(S′, R), ...}
P \ {empower(S,R)} ∪ {empower(S′, R)}
AAM {..., consider(T,A), obligation(N,R,A, V, [Ca, Cd], Cv),
action(T ′),¬consider(T ′, A), ...}
P \ {consider(T,A)} ∪ {consider(T ′, A)}
OVM {..., use(O, V ), obligation(N,R,A, V, [Ca, Cd], Cv),
object(O′),¬use(O′, V ), ...}
P \ {use(O, V )} ∪ {use(O′, V )}
RHE {..., sub-role(R,R1),
obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), ...}
P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R1, A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
RHR {..., sub-role(R1, R),
obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), ...}
P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R1, A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
CAR {..., obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), context(C1)...}
∧Ca = C1 ∧ C1 = ⊥
P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca ∧ C1, Cd], Cv)}
CAE {..., obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), context(C1), ...}
∧Ca = C1 ∧ C1 = ⊥
P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca ∨ C1, Cd], Cv)}
CAN {..., obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), ... } P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [¬Ca, Cd], Cv)}
CSAD {..., obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), ...} ∧Ca = Cd P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Cd, Ca], Cv)}
CSAV {..., obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), ...} ∧Cd = Cv P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Cv , Cd], Ca)}
CSDV {..., obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), ...} ∧Cd = Cv P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
∪ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cv ], Cd)}
RD {..., obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv), ...} P \ {obligation(N,R,A,O, [Ca, Cd], Cv)}
TABLE I
MUTATION OPERATORS
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Fig. 4. Obligation mutation process
we assume that the state of obligations can be checked (are
observable) by test cases that need to verify what obligations
are active, violated and fulﬁlled.
VI. RESULTS
We use the meeting system as a case study for getting
preliminary results on mutating obligation policies. We start
by explaining the test selection process, then we study the gen-
erated mutants and the test results, especially those regarding
alive mutants.
A. Test Selection
We had 21 tests for validating all obligations rules. In fact,
we ended up with 7 rules that are manually derived from
the three obligation rules presented in the previous section.
The derivation is done according to the hierarchy for the ﬁrst
two rules (two derived rules for each rule), except for the
last one because only the moderator is expected to send the
report. We had 21 tests for validating the 7 rules. Each 3 tests
target a speciﬁc obligation rule and check three scenarios (one
for activation, and one for violation and one for fulﬁlment).
Test cases are independent from each others. For instance, the
test that checks for rule violation context, starts by initializing
the obligation activation context, then validating the expected
behaviour in case of violation.
B. Mutation results
The next table shows the number of mutants that have
been generated. The ﬁrst three mutation operators were not
implemented due to technical reasons related to the meeting
system. For instance, concerning SRM, in the meeting systems
users are not stored in the database and therefore, we cannot
modify the userr´ole and delete his/her mapping with that
role. This is the ﬁrst lesson learnt from this case study:
implementing obligation policies - and thus mutation operators
- may be complex and system-speciﬁc. The implementation
of obligations requires weaving monitors at the right locations
in the system and collecting dynamically all the events that
are relevant to the computing of contexts for each instantiated
obligation rule. More precisely, the monitoring is performed
by weaving a piece of code that is called when a method is
executed (a method related to obligation activation, violation
or fulﬁllment). The method parameters are then extracted to
store the value of the user and the other parameters that
will then be used to create the event with all its parameters.
This event will then be handled to update obligations states.
The implementation of obligations is a complex process that
is consequently error-prone. Mutation at the obligation level
forces the test cases to detect whether this change (mutation in
the obligation policy) is propagated into the system. Indirectly,
the mutation allows exercising the interactions between the
policy manager and the application code.
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Mutants Number
SRM,AAM,OVM 0
RHE 4
RHR 1
CAR 7
CAE 7
CAN 7
CSAD 7
CSAV 7
CSDV 7
RD 7
All 54
TABLE II
MUTATION OPERATORS
In the next table, we present the mutation analysis results. It
is interesting to analyse the reasons why certain mutants were
not killed, namely the single RHR mutant and some CAR
and CAE mutants). These alive mutants have in common that
they either add new obligation rules or make the scope of an
existing rule wider (e.g. applicable to other subjects).
Mutants Number Killed Score
RHE 4 4 100%
RHR 1 0 0%
CAR 7 3 42%
CAE 7 4 57%
CAN 7 7 100%
CSAD 7 7 100%
CSAV 7 7 100%
CSDV 7 7 100%
RD 7 7 100%
All 54 46 85%
TABLE III
MUTATION OPERATORS
Our tests were not able to detect such changes since the
test cases just check the initial obligation policy and not rules
applicable to other subjects. This is the case for the mutation
operator RHR, that replaces a rule with role r1 by a rule with
role r2 where r1 is sub-role of r2. When rules are derived
according to these hierarchy rules, we end up with at least
two rules (one derived and one newly added rule). Our test
selection process, that is straightforward and systematic with
regard to the initial policy, we test behaviours related to the
roles explicitly associated with an obligation in the initial
policy. With such a test selection process, it is unlikely to
exercise other behaviours than those speciﬁed in the initial
policy.
In terms of functionality, testing the implementation of an
obligation policy is a two-fold issue that our mutation analysis
highlights:
1) test cases must ensure that what is speciﬁed for a given
role is correctly enforced. Any role that is submitted to
an obligation must be monitored, and one must check
that the obligation states evolve as expected. All the
killed mutants are related to this category of test cases.
2) test cases must also ensure that no other subject is under
the control of an obligation rule: this means that the test
cases must test unspeciﬁed parts of the policy. The alive
mutants could only be killed with this second category
of test cases.
The selection process that we use for the experiment cannot
cover this second case. However, while testing speciﬁed cases
requires a reasonable effort, it seems costly to generate tests
covering all possible wrong assignments of obligations to
roles or subjects. This is the second lesson learnt from this
experiment: investigating more effective test selection and
generation techniques for obligations is a key research issue.
VII. RELATED WORK
Yue Jia’s survey [18] lists a relatively small number of
papers that are related to security policies and mutation. At the
origin of this work are [8], [9], [10] which study testing access
control languages. Other studies proposed techniques and tools
for testing the PDP implementation of security policies written
in XACML [11], [19] and RBAC [20], [21]. Fisler et al.
[22] proposes Magrave, a tool for analyzing XACML policies
and performing change-impact analysis. In [11], Xie et al.
proposed a new tool Cirg that automatically generates test
for XACML policies using Change-Impact Analysis. Several
researchers generate tests from access control policies using
various forms of state machines [12], [23]. In addition, Several
studies propose the use of fault-injection or mutation targeting
different aspects of security testing. For instance, adaptative
vulnerability analysis [24] injects faults to the application data
ﬂow and internal variables. The objective is to identify parts
of application’s code that have insecure behaviour when the
state of the application is disturbed. The work that is related
to security policy testing was done by Martin et al. [11] who
proposed a mutation fault model speciﬁc to XACML policies.
The same PDP-alone based testing approach is considered by
Mathur et al. [20], who also mutate RBAC models by building
an FSM model for RBAC and use strategies to produce test
suites from this model (for conformance testing). Going along
the same lines, Sharma et al. [26] propose the ACPC model
(Access Control Policy Checker) which includes mutation
operators for comparing the original policy response with the
response of mutant policy.
We conclude that all of these papers focus on testing access
control policies, whereas a security policy encompasses more
than this access control dimension. Going one step further,
we investigate how security policies which include obligations
should be tested. This justiﬁes this proposal of a mutation-
based approach for testing obligation policies, that has, as far
as we know, no equivalent today.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Making explicit the rights and duties of system actors is
one of the key challenges for nowadays security and privacy.
An obligation policy enables the speciﬁcation of some of
theses aspects, but the mechanisms required for managing,
monitoring and enforcing it may be complex and depend on
the system’s nature.
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In this paper, we propose an architecture for making testable
a system extended with an obligation policy. The policy man-
ager (equivalent to a Policy Decision Point in an access control
logic) is responsible for computing the current states of each
rule associated to all the actors submitted to an obligation and
deciding what actions must be enforced (such as sanctions).
Since the interactions between the policy manager and the
system may be faulty, we propose a test qualiﬁcation technique
that checks systems enforcing obligation policies. In particular,
we identiﬁed key elements in the management of obligation
policies, then we deﬁned mutation operators that inject errors
related to these key elements. A non-detection of these errors
would reveal the inability of a test suite to ensure the correct
application of the policy. One advantage of our work is
that it is relatively generic and can be adapted for testing
different policies. We have validated our mutation techniques
by implementing obligation policies and their management
using a separate policy manager module. We then used our
mutation operators to derive mutant versions of the policy and
ran test cases and presented the mutation results. First lessons
have been learnt from this experiment.
Future work consists of studying more thoroughly the test-
ing of obligation policies. In particular, we intend to develop
new techniques to test the policy manager separately from the
application and then compare our results with those obtained
when the whole security mechanism is tested. In addition, we
would like to study the generation of test cases for obligation
policies using formal techniques. Finally, the deﬁnition of
other mutation operators to create more sophisticated mutants
for usage control is among the research directions that we
intend to pursue.
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